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Stochastic geometrya b s t r a c t
This work focuses on infrastructure-less ad hoc wireless networks where multiple trans-
mitter/receiver pairs share the same radio resources (spectrum); transmitters have to
choose how to split a total power budget across orthogonal spectrum bands with the goal
to maximize their sum rate under cumulative interference from concurrent transmissions.
We start off by introducing and characterizing the non-cooperative game among transmit-
ter/receiver pairs when the network topology is deterministically given. The corresponding
Nash equilibria are derived, highlighting their dependency on the topological parameters
(distances between wireless nodes, propagation model, and background noise power).
The analysis is then extended to the case of random network topologies drawn from a
given spatial stochastic process. Tools of stochastic geometry are leveraged to derive a
statistical characterization of the equilibria of the spectrum sharing game. Finally, a dis-
tributed algorithm is proposed to let the players of the spectrum sharing game converge
to equilibria conditions. Numerical simulations show that the proposed algorithm drives
the users to stable points that are close to the equilibria of the game requiring limited
information exchange among nodes.
 2015 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
Resource sharing problems naturally arise in case of
wireless networks where the transmission medium is
inherently broadcast and transmission resources, e.g., fre-
quency channels, transmission power levels, temporal
slots, have to be orchestrated among multiple concurrent
transmissions. The general goal is the design of sharing
algorithms/protocol to maximize the ‘‘usage efﬁciency’’ of
the shared resources.In this work, we focus on infrastructure-less ad hoc
wireless networks where multiple transmitter/receiver
pairs share the same radio resources (spectrum). Each pair
is allowed to allocate an available transmission power
budget across multiple radio resources for transmission
(reception). Such scenario well represents those practical
cases where either multiple Network Interface Cards (NICs)
are available at each transmitter/receiver [3] or where the
transmission technology allows to use different power
levels on different subcarriers, like the IEEE 802.11a
OFDMA-based technology [4]. In any case, the ‘‘quality’’
perceived by a transmitter/receiver pair is inﬂuenced by
the behavior (resource allocation) of the other users. The
reference scenario is inherently distributed as there is no
central entity to coordinate the resource allocation
network-wide, but rather each transmitter/receiver pair
64 PREPRINT VERSIONadopts local resource allocation policies depending of its
local view and knowledge of the network. In this view,
our main goals are to tell whether (and when) there exist
equilibrium policies which are stable; whether these equi-
libria are unique; and whether they can be reached by dis-
tributed algorithms. To this extent, we model the
interaction among users as a non-cooperative game.
In particular, we consider a Gaussian Interference Game
(GIG) [5], where multiple transmitters have to decide how
to split a total power budget across orthogonal spectrum
bands with equal bandwidth; the users play to maximize
their sum rate over all the used bands which depends on
the interference level produced by the other users and
some background Gaussian noise. Since the wireless
network performance is strongly inﬂuenced by the spatial
distribution of the communicating/interfering nodes, a
natural objective is to analyze the dependency of the equi-
libria distribution on the node positions. To this extent, we
start off by introducing and characterizing the non-coop-
erative game where the network topology is deterministi-
cally given, that is, the relative positions of transmitters
and receivers are known. We take here a constructive
approach by analyzing at ﬁrst a simple but insightful
network topology with two transmitter/receiver pairs. In
this scenario, we derive the quality/number of the Nash
equilibria, highlighting their dependency on the
topological parameters (distances between wireless nodes,
propagation model, and background noise power). We
show that the game solution features a bi-modal behavior
in which if the two pairs are ‘‘far enough’’ the equilibrium
is unique and coincide with the optimal centralized-based
allocation, whereas if the two pairs ‘‘get closer’’ the game
admits multiple equilibria that in general do not coincide
with the optimum.
The paper then moves to the characterization of the
non-cooperative spectrum sharing game for random
network topologies drawn from a given spatial stochastic
process. We leverage tools of stochastic geometry to derive
a statistical characterization of the equilibria of the
spectrum sharing game. Again, we start off by providing
the analysis of the equilibria in the two transmitter/re-
ceiver pairs scenario; we further show how the analysis
of the 2-player game can be leveraged to characterize the
N-player game. Namely, the analysis of large networks
game can be simpliﬁed, by wisely decomposing the N-
player game into independent equivalent sub-games of
two players. A heuristic algorithm is proposed to
implement such decomposition, thus allowing to get the
equilibria for the N-player game. Finally, a distributed
algorithm is introduced to let the N players converge to
equilibria conditions. Numerical simulations show that
the proposed algorithm drives the users to stable points
that are close to the equilibria of the game further
requiring only minimal information exchange.
In short, the main contributions of the present work can
be summarized as follows:
1. Analysis of the 2-player spectrum sharing game.
(a) Characterization for deterministic topologies of the
Nash equilibria, their stability and quality with
respect to the optimal solution.(b) Analysis of the spectrum sharing game in stochastic
topologies.
2. Analysis of the N-player spectrum sharing game.
(a) Proof of existence of at least one Nash equilibrium
in pure strategy.
(b) Analysis through directed inﬂuence graph approach
and coupling probability.
3. Distributed algorithm to drive the selﬁsh user to play
equilibria strategies in spectrum sharing.
The paper is organized as follows: in Section 2 we
review prior work on game theoretic approaches to spec-
trum/resource sharing in wireless networks; Section 3 sets
the reference scenario; Section 4 provides a detailed
analysis of the 2-player game; Section 5 extends the analy-
sis to the N-player game; Section 6 provides distributed
algorithm to reach equilibrium and compare the result
with the game solutions; and Section 7 concludes the
paper.
2. Related work
The relevant literature includes work on game theoretic
tools and stochastic geometry applied to network
scenarios where network nodes have to optimally allocate
transmitted power across multiple (semi-) orthogonal
bands with target of maximizing the achievable
throughput. Such problem is indeed relevant in different
networking scenarios including ad hoc networks, cognitive
radio networks and wireless access networks. In the
following, we give a succinct overview of the main ﬁndings
and approaches related to these three application
scenarios. In [6], the authors consider a power control
problem with SINR as objective function, in both selﬁsh
and cooperative scenario. In the selﬁsh case, the users play
to maximize their achievable average SINR over all the
resources they use to transmit; existence and ‘‘quality’’ of
the Nash equilibria are studied under different cases for
mutual interference between the users over the available
resources. In the cooperative scenario, the users play to
maximize the sum average SINR.
Wang and Krunz consider in [7] a non cooperative
scenario where users compete in the power allocation to
maximize their performances. A pricing mechanism to
steer the non-cooperative spectrum sharing process
towards optimal equilibria is proposed.
Power games based on the water-ﬁlling algorithm are
proposed in [8,9]. The authors consider a scenario
composed by two contending communicating systems
and study the existence and uniqueness of the Nash equi-
librium. The water-ﬁlling algorithm is used also in [10,11].
A uniﬁed view of main results presented in the literature is
proposed in [12]. This work shows how the different
approaches proposed in the literature can be uniﬁed
following a unique interpretation of the water-ﬁlling solu-
tion. Furthermore, a uniﬁed set of sufﬁcient conditions that
guarantee the uniqueness of the equilibrium is derived.
Baidas and McKenzie [13] leverage auction mechanisms
to properly set the transmission power levels in multi-
source, multi-relay wireless networks in a cooperative
environment.
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networks are considered in [14–16]. Existence and proper-
ties of the Nash equilibria are investigated assuming the
interference temperature model.
In [5], a Gaussian Interference Game (GIG) is proposed,
in which a player can allocate a ﬁxed amount of power
arbitrarily across a continuous bandwidth with the aim
to maximize its sum rate under Gaussian interference.
The authors further propose self-enforcing rules that allow
users to reach an efﬁcient and fair solution. Different from
our case, the available bandwidth is considered as con-
tinuous, whereas we consider the case in which discrete
frequency channel can be used.
Spatial reuse is explicitly accounted for in the spectrum
sharing process in the so called spatial congestion games,
which model the competition among secondary users of
a cognitive radio network in accessing spectrum opportu-
nities [17,18] and references therein. In [17], the conges-
tion game is played on undirected interference graph,
assuming symmetric wireless links, whereas [18] extends
the model to the case of directed interference graphs. Exis-
tence of Nash equilibria and distributed convergence algo-
rithms are proposed in both works.
Two system pairs sharing two frequency bands are con-
sidered in [19]. For three different relaying strategies, the
existence and the uniqueness of the equilibrium are ana-
lyzed. The general scenario with multiple transmission
pairs is addressed in [20], where the power allocation
game is modeled as a potential game that is shown to pos-
sess a unique equilibrium. When the channels are assumed
to ﬂuctuate stochastically over time, stochastic approxima-
tion theory is used to show convergence to equilibrium.
Different from our case, the aforementioned two papers
assumes that the two transmitters can exploit the presence
of a common relaying node.
The competition for accessing the available radio
resources may as well happen among wireless networks
as a whole, rather than among single wireless links, as con-
sidered in the aforementioned papers [21–23]. In [22], the
authors study the competition between two wireless
access networks operating according the IEEE 802.22 stan-
dard. The problem is cast as a non-cooperative power game
in which each player aims at maximizing its coverage by
increasing its transmission power while taking into
account the interaction with the competitor which hap-
pens through reciprocal interference. In [23], a Stackelberg
formulation of the spectrum sharing game is proposed
where the two operators are prioritized in playing their
strategies.
To wrap up, in this work we generally advance the lit-
erature on power allocation in wireless networks by cou-
pling tools of game theory and stochastic geometry [24].
To the best of our knowledge, ours is one of the ﬁrst
attempts to propose a stochastic analysis of non-
cooperative games in the context of wireless networks. A
notable exception is represented by the work in [25],
where the authors propose a stochastic game that models
the interactions among users competing for the available
spectrum opportunities. However, the game used in [25]
is different then ours as it is based on an auction in which
users make bids for the required resources.3. Scenario
We use standard probabilistic notation: sans-serif let-
ters (e.g., x) denote random variables (RV) and italic char-
acters denote their corresponding value (e.g., x). The
cumulative distribution function (cdf), its complement
(ccdf), and probability density function (pdf) are denoted
FxðxÞ; FxðxÞ ¼ 1 FxðxÞ; f xðxÞ, respectively, with the
natural notational extensions for conditional and joint
distributions.3.1. Game model
We consider a Binomial Point Process (BPP)
PN ¼ fu1; . . . ; uNg where N transmitters are positioned
independently and uniformly at random in a convex set
A  R2 with N=jAj ¼ k; we refer to k as the density. The
N receivers fv1; . . . ; vNg are each positioned independently
and uniformly at random on the circle of radius di centered
at the corresponding transmitter. We choose the BPP
model since it is the most natural model when no concrete
information on the user distribution is available.
Furthermore, it has the advantages of being simple, tract-
able, and consistent with prevailing use in the literature.
Fig. 1 reports an example of the considered topology.
We consider the spectrum sharing game, where the N
transmitters (the players) have to decide how to split the
total power budget over the available spectrum (the
actions). Namely, we assume that the spectrum is divided
into two bands, which we label the left band and right
band. The strategy space of the generic transmitter i is
Pi 2 ½0;1, where Pi is the fraction of power that pair i uses
in the left band and Pi ¼ 1 Pi is the fraction of power in
the right band. The utility function (payoff) that each player
aims at maximizing is deﬁned as the sum achievable Shan-
non rate over the two bands when the interference from
the other players is treated as noise.
The purpose of this initial analysis is to investigate
how the topology of the network inﬂuences the strategic
split of transmission power across channels. First, we
investigate the performance in terms of sum rate
achieved by the network when the spectrum is split into
two channels and the split of transmission powers across
channels constitutes a Nash equilibrium. We also com-
pare this with the solution achieved under the optimal
transmission power split. Second, we investigate the
dependence of the Nash and optimal transmission power
splits on the network topology. We ﬁnd that the answers
to both these questions are subtle, even for the simplest
non-trivial case of two channels. Extensions to larger
numbers of channels are likewise of interest, but we
leave investigation of these questions for more than
two channels as future work.
We assume a channel model with pure pathloss
attenuation, where ais the pathloss exponent. Also, let g
be the noise power on each band. First, we introduce the
game in which the utility function of the players is given
by the sum of the Shannon rate of the two bands, consider-
ing as interference the sum over all the other transmitting
nodes. We refer to this game as R-interference game and
Fig. 1. Illustration of some of the Tx–Rx pairs, where the Tx locations
form a BPP, and the Rx locations are selected to sit uniformly at random at








Fig. 2. The considered 2-player topology, where the two transmitters are
randomly placed and t is the distance between them. Receivers are also
deployed randomly at distance d1 and d2 from the transmitters.
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powers P  ðP1 . . . PNÞ 2 ½0;1N is:













where xij  kuj  vik is the distance between receiver vi and
transmitter uj.
Similarly, we deﬁne the M-interference game. In this
case, the interference sum is approximated by its maxi-
mum value. In other words, each transmitter makes a deci-
sion on the best strategy based on the nearest interferer
only. Formally, players and actions are the same as deﬁned
above, but the utility function of the generic player i for
transmission powers P  ðP1 . . . PNÞ 2 ½0;1N is:













Introducing the M-interference game allows us to have a
more tractable model. Furthermore, the relationship
between the two games can be formally discussed. In par-
ticular, the sum and maximum (shot noise) interference





MPN ðvjÞ  max
ui2PNnfujg
kui  vjka:
Properties of these processes as well as their relationship
have been widely discussed in the literature on probability.
As highlighted in [26] (Section 2.5), the sum interference
RV R is subexponential, meaning that:
lim
z!1
PðRPN ðvjÞ > zÞ
PðMPN ðvjÞ > zÞ
¼ 1: ð1Þ
This shows that the two processes have Complementary
Cumulative Distribution Functions (CCDFs) that areasymptotically equal. In other words, the probability of
the sum being large is roughly the same as the probability
of the max being large. As pointed out in [26], large sums
occur due to a small number of large individual contribu-
tions; they do not occur due to a large number of small
individual contributions.
Furthermore, as discussed in [27], one can deﬁne a
homogeneous marked point process (with marks repre-
senting, in our context, transmission power), with an
intensity thinned by retaining those points for which the
sum (max) interference seen within a certain radius of
each point is below a speciﬁed threshold. Analogous to
(1), the ratio of these intensities from thinning using a
sum vs. max interference representation has an asymptotic
limit (in lambda), which is a function of the pathloss expo-
nent alpha (c.f. Section 4.4 in [27]). Furthermore, this ratio
approaches one as a!1.
The aforementioned analysis suggests that we can
approximate the R-interference game with the more tract-
ableM-interference game. The ‘‘quality’’ of this approxima-
tion is discussed throughout the paper.
4. The 2-player game
In this section, we consider the spectrum sharing game
when N ¼ 2. The reference topology is reported in Fig. 2.
We label the distance between the two transmitters t
and, assuming that the corresponding receivers are placed
uniformly around each transmitter i at a distance di; a and
b are uniform angles in the range ½0;2p. For simplicity, we
call x1 and x2 the distance between receiver 1 and trans-
mitter 2 and the distance between receiver 2 and transmit-
ter 1, respectively. In this particular case, the R-
interference game and M-interference game coincide
and the utility function of player 1 for transmission powers
P  ðP1; P2Þ 2 ½0;12 is













and for player 2 is













First, we characterize the game deriving pure strategy
Nash equilibria and optimal solution when the topology
is assumed to be ﬁx. Then, we provide a stochastic charac-
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deployed over a given area.
4.1. Pure strategy Nash equilibria and optimal solution
Each one of the two players is assumed to be selﬁsh,
that is, it allocates power between the two bands trying
to maximize the achieved throughput (i.e., without taking
into account the global optimum). Therefore, the stable
operating points for the two players are the Nash equilib-
ria. A Nash equilibrium is a pair ðP1; P2Þ 2 ½0;12 from
which neither player has incentive to unilaterally deviate.
First, recall that the best response for player 1; P1ðP2Þ, can
be easily derived setting equal to zero the partial derivative














where we deﬁne ½x10 :¼maxð0;minð1; xÞÞ. The best respon-
se for player 2; P2ðP1Þ, can be similarly derived. Then, the
Nash equilibria are the points in which best responses of
different players intersect. We can now state the following.
Theorem 4.1. The 2-player game has Nash equilibria given
byNE¼





if x1 > d1;x1x2 < d1d2;
ð0:5;0:5Þ; ð0;bþ2 Þ; ð1;b2 Þ
 
if x2 > d2;x1x2 < d1d2;
fðP1;P2Þ 2 Lg if x1x2 ¼ d1d2




where bi ¼ 0:5 1 xai =dai
 
and L ¼ fðP1; P2Þ : P1 ¼
0:5þ xa1 =da1 0:5 P2ð Þj x1x2 ¼ d1d2g.Proof. By deﬁnition, Nash equilibria are the point in which
the two best responses cross. Then, substituting Eq. (4) into
the equation P1ðP2Þ ¼ P2ðP1Þ, one can derive the set of NE
given in Eq. (5). (Refer to [28], Section 6.4.2, for the com-
plete proof.) h
Since, in general, the Nash equilibrium reﬂects the self-
ish behavior of the players, it is often inefﬁcient from the
system point of view. Therefore, it is useful to compare
the Nash equilibria of a game with the ‘‘globally’’ optimal
solution, i.e., the one that could be achieved with a central-
ized control. Usually, this comparison is done in terms of
social utility, e.g., the sum of the utility of all the players,
UT ¼ U1 þ U2. In particular, the social/global optimal sum
utility is
UT ¼ maxðP1 ;P2Þ2½0;12
UTðP1; P2Þ: ð6Þ
This quantity exists by virtue of the fact that UT is con-
tinuous and bounded on ½0;12. Unfortunately, providing
explicit characterization of such optimal solution is
possible only for the symmetric case x1 ¼ x2 and d1 ¼ d2.
However, extensive analysis has shown that in most ofthe cases the following claim, which is valid for general
x1 and x2, assuming d1 ¼ d2, holds.
Claim 4.1. The optimal solution for the 2-player game, when
d1 ¼ d2 ¼ d, is given byOpt ¼
fð0;1Þ; ð1;0Þg if f opt < 0;
fðPi; PjÞ : Pi þ Pj ¼ 1g if f opt ¼ 0;
fð0:5;0:5Þg if f opt > 0;
8><
>: ð7Þ
where f opt ¼ xa1 xa2 þ gxa1 þ gxa2  gda. Moreover, the
function UT is concave for f opt > 0, and has a saddle point
at P ¼ ð0:5;0:5Þ for f opt < 0.Proof. As mentioned above, a formal proof is provided
only for the symmetric case x1 ¼ x2 (cfr. Appendix D in
[28]). Furthermore, to extend such result, we have studied
the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions for the opti-
mization problem. The analysis shows that f opt < 0 is a
necessary conditions for ð0;1Þ and ð1;0Þ to be local optima.
Extensive numerical analysis supports our claim for the
general case x1 – x2. (Refer to [28], Section 6.3.2, for the
complete analysis.) h
The ‘‘quality’’ of an equilibrium can be assessed using
the concepts of Price of Stability (PoS) [29] and Price of
Anarchy (PoA) [30]. They are, respectively, the ratio
between the optimal solution that could be achieved by
players in a centralized system and the best/worst Nash












The comprehensive characterization of the game is
reported in Fig. 3, assuming d1 ¼ d2 ¼ d. Note that there
exist four regions. When x1x2 < d
2, the game admits three
equilibria and the optimum is in ð0;1Þ and ð1;0Þ. In par-
ticular, when both x1 and x2 are smaller than d, the PoS is
one, since the best equilibrium and the optimum coincide.
In contrast, when x1 (or x2) is greater than d, the best equi-
librium is worse than the optimum, then the PoS is greater
than one. The PoA is in both cases greater than one. When
x1x2 > d
2 and f opt < 0 the game admits a unique equilibri-
um, that does not coincide with the optimum, then PoS and
PoA coincide and are greater than one. In contrast, when
f opt > 0 the optimal solution and the unique equilibrium
coincide. Furthermore, along the curve x1x2 ¼ d2 the two
best responses coincide and there exists an inﬁnite number
of equilibria.
Finally, the quality of Nash equilibria can also be
characterized by their stability. A Nash equilibrium is
stable if a small change in strategies for one player
leads to a situation where the player with the small change
in his strategy will return immediately to the Nash





















PoS ≥ 1, PoA ≥ 1
NE: (0.5,0.5)
OPT: (0,1), (1,0)




x1 x2 = d
2
Infinite number of NE
NE: (0.5,0.5),




PoS ≥ 1, PoA ≥ 1
NE: (0.5,0.5), (0,1), (1,0)
OPT: (0,1), (1,0)
PoS=1 and PoA≥ 1
Fig. 3. Nash equilibria, optimal allocations, PoS and PoA for the 2-player game as a function of x1 and x2, when d1 ¼ d2 ¼ d ¼ 25.
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ing the stability of the equilibria.
Theorem 4.2. The Nash equilibria of the 2-player game can
be classiﬁed as follows:
 When x1x2 > d1d2; ð0:5;0:5Þ is the unique equilibrium and
is stable.
 When x1x2 ¼ d1d2, there is an inﬁnite number,
8ðPi;PjÞ 2 L, of unstable equilibria.
 When x1x2 < d1d2, there are 3 equilibria and ð0:5;0:5Þ is
the only unstable equilibrium.Proof. To prove the theorem, let us assume that the play-
ers are at the equilibrium in ð0:5;0:5Þ and one of the two
decides to deviate of a small . Let us observe the sequence
of the best responses:



































































:Therefore, if x1x2 > d1d2 the two best responses con-
verge for N !1 to ð0:5;0:5Þ, proving the ﬁrst part of the
theorem. In contrast, when x1x2 < d1d2 the equilibrium in
ð0:5Þ is not stable.
We now prove that the other two equilibria, which exist
when x1x2 < d1d2, are stable. Consider the case in which
x1 < d1 and x2 < d2. Assume that the users have reached
the equilibrium in ð0;1Þ. Note that player 1 has a best
response equal to 0 for every P2 2 ½0:5þ 0:5da1 =xa1 ;1.
This means that if player 2 deviates of an  < 0:5da1 =x
a
1 ,
the best response of player 1 does not change, and
therefore also player 2 will be incentivized to return to
the equilibrium ð0;1Þ, since her best response is equal to 1
for every P1 2 ½0;0:5 0:5da2 =xa2 .
Similar considerations can be derived when
x1x2 < d1d2 but either x1 > d1 or x2 > d2. In particular
one can observe that the best response dynamics push
the users in a point different from the equilibrium, but
at the next step they will come back again at the same
stable point.
Finally, when x1x2 ¼ d1d2 all the equilibria (inﬁnite
number) are unstable. In fact, every  deviation in the
played strategies leads the two player to a new different
equilibrium. h
From this analysis, we can conclude that the equilibrium
(as well as the corresponding PoS/PoA) and its stability
depend upon the two interference distances ðx1; x2Þ. When
node positions are random, it follows that distances are
random, and thus the equilibrium is random. Therefore,
we now provide a stochastic characterization of the game.
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4.2.1. Conditional joint pdf of the interference distances
We refer to Fig. 2 and we assume that the two transmit-
ters are placed at random and we condition on the distance
separating them t. Note that angles a and b are indepen-
dent random variables. It follows that the interference dis-
tances x1; x2 are conditionally independent given t:
Fx1 ;x2 jtðx1; x2jtÞ  Pðx1 6 x1; x2 6 x2jtÞ
¼ Pðx1 6 x1jtÞPðx2 6 x2jtÞ: ð9Þ
Using the law of cosines x21 ¼ d21 þ t2  2d1t cos a:
Pðx1 6 x1jtÞ ¼ Pðd21 þ t2  2d1t cos a 6 x21jtÞ
¼ P cos aP ðd
2





The following proposition is elementary.
Proposition 4.3. The random variable w, cosine of a uni-






p ; FwðwÞ ¼ 12þ
1
p
sin1 w; w 2 ½1;1:
Using this result, we can now state the following
theorem.Theorem 4.4. The joint pdf of x1; x2 conditioned on t is
given by
f x1 ;x2 jtðx1;x2jtÞ¼
x1x2
p2d1d2bðtÞ jd1 tj6 x16d1þ t















 2" #vuut .Proof. For the sake of brevity, we only report some














Fig. 4. Conditional joint pdf (left) and cdf (rigP cos aP











Then Fx1 ;x2 jtðx1; x2jtÞ follows by Eq. (9), requiring the
argument of the cdf FwðwÞ to be between 1 and 1. Eq.
(11) follows directly from taking the double partial
derivative with respect to x1 and x2:
f x1 ;x2 jtðx1; x2jtÞ ¼
@2
@x1@x2
Fx1 ;x2 jtðx1; x2jtÞ: 
Fig. 4 shows the conditional joint pdf and cdf when
d1 ¼ d2 ¼ 1 and t ¼ 3. Note that we obtain a function dif-
ferent from zero only in the region fðx1; x2Þ : jd1  tj 6 x1
6 d1 þ t; jd2  tj 6 x2 6 d2 þ tg, consistent with the
topology shown in Fig. 2. Indeed, due to the geometry of
the problem (the sum of any two sides of a triangle must
be greater than the third side), the following inequalities
must hold:
jd1  tj 6 x1 6 d1 þ t; ð12Þ
jd2  tj 6 x2 6 d2 þ t;
maxfjd1  x1j; jd2  x2jg 6 t 6minfd1 þ x1;d2 þ x2g:4.2.2. Joint pdf of the mutual interference distances
For any distribution on the random distance t
separating the transmitters, we obtain the joint (uncondi-
tioned) distribution for ðx1; x2Þ by the total probability
theorem:
f x1 ;x2 ðx1; x2Þ ¼
Z 1
0
f x1 ;x2 jtðx1; x2jtÞf tðtÞdt: ð13Þ
Note that, as shown in Eq. (12), the RVs x1; x2 are not
(unconditionally) independent.
We will henceforth assume the random transmitter
separation distance t is determined by placing one of the
transmitters at the origin of a disk of radius L, and placing
the second transmitter uniformly at random in the disk.
We emphasize, however, that Eq. (13) holds for any distri-
bution on t, and our assumption is merely for the purpose













ht) of x1 and x2 when d ¼ 1 and t ¼ 3.
Table 1
Different events that are considered in the stochastic analysis of the game
when d1 ¼ d2 ¼ d.
‘‘event’’ P
unique x1x2 > d
2
(0.5,0.5)–(0,1)–(1,0) x1 < d ^ x2 < d
mixed x1x2 < d
2 ^ ðx1 > d _ x2 > dÞ
inﬁnite x1x2 ¼ d2
coincide w/opt ðx1x2Þa þ gðxa1 þ xa2  daÞ > 0
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 2
; f tðtÞ ¼
2t
L2
; 0 6 t 6 L: ð14Þ
We can now state the following theorem.
Theorem 4.5. Suppose the distance t between the two
transmitters has the distribution in Eq. (14). Then the joint
pdf of x1; x2 is given by




max fjd1x1 j;jd2x2 jg
t
bðtÞdt; ð15Þ
where bðtÞ is given in Theorem 4.4 and the support of ðx1; x2Þ
is given by Eq. (12).Proof. Substitute Eq. (14) for f tðtÞ and Eq. (11) for
f x1 ;x2 jtðx1; x2jtÞ in Eq. (13), using constraints in Eq. (12). h
Note that, in general, it is not possible to provide close
form expression of the integral in Eq. (15). Numerical eval-
uation, however, is straightforward.
4.2.3. Distribution on the Nash equilibria
We can now use the joint distribution in Theorem 4.5 to
compute the distribution of the equilibria in Fig. 3. Each
equilibria’s probability can be evaluated via:Z
P
f x1 ;x2 ðx1; x2Þdx1dx2;
where P is the set of points that deﬁnes that region. Table 1
summaries the different cases, which are also illustrated in
Fig. 5. Note that due to the restriction adopted in Claim 4.1,
we assume hereafter in this section d1 ¼ d2 ¼ d, so that we
can include the comparison with the optimal solution. In
particular, unique refers to the probability that the equilib-
rium is unique. When the equilibrium is not unique, we
consider two cases. The case in which the three equilibria
are ð0:5;0:5Þ; ð0;1Þ and ð1;0Þ, i.e., (0.5,0.5)–(0,1)–(1,0), and
the case in which the equilibria depend on the parameter
b, (mixed). For completeness, we also provide the probabil-
ity that there is an inﬁnite number of equilibria (inﬁnite).
Finally, we evaluate the probability that the unique equilib-
rium and the optimal solution coincide (coincide w/opt).
Numerical results for all these probabilities are reported
in Fig. 6. We consider different values of d, with L varying
from 0.1 to 50. We assume g ¼ 103 and a ¼ 4.
The probability of having a unique equilibrium, that
corresponds to the case in which players decide to use
the whole spectrum, increases with L and approaches 1when L ’ 5d. This is reasonable since interference decreas-
es with L. The probability that the optimum and the unique
equilibrium coincide has a similar behavior of the prob-
ability of uniqueness, but it is lower. This comes from the
fact that when the equilibrium and the optimum coincide,
the equilibrium is also unique, but the opposite is not
always true. Fig. 7 (left) reports the topology when L! 0,
i.e., L ¼ , for any small  > 0. In this case, each x can be
a little bit greater or a little bit smaller than d (remember
that x2 ¼ d2 þ 2  2d cos a). Fig. 7 (right) shows why,
when L approaches zero, the probability of unique equilib-
rium is equal to 0.5 (given by the probability that both the
xs are greater than d). Complementary, the probability of
having fð0;1Þ; ð1;0Þ; ð0:5;0:5Þg (both x’s are less than d)
and the mixed case (when only one x is greater than d,
but both below the curve x1x2 ¼ d2) are both 0.25. Finally,
note that when L goes to zero the optimum never coincides
with the equilibrium in ð0:5;0:5Þ. In fact, when L ¼ , the
two x’s are both close to d and they do not satisfy the con-
dition f opt > 0.
In this section, we have fully characterized the 2-player
game, both assuming a deterministic and a random topol-
ogy. The analysis has highlighted important properties of
such game. It always admits at least one Nash equilibrium
in pure strategy and at least one of such equilibria is stable.
These properties are also used in the following section. We
will show how the N-player game can be decomposed in
sub-graphs and we will propose a distributed protocol that
relies on the existence and stability of the 2-player sub-
games.
5. The N-player game
As done for the 2-player game, we can derive the






























where Pi  ðP1; . . . ; Pi1; Piþ1; . . . ; PNÞ.
Theorem 5.1. The strategy proﬁle Pi ¼ 0:5;8i 2 N is always
a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for both the R-interference
game and the M-interference game.Proof. The proof comes directly by observing that
substituting Pj ¼ 0:5 in both Eq. (16) and Eq. (17) we obtain
Pi ¼ 0:5;8i; j. h
Therefore, even when users play considering the near-
est interferer only, we can still guarantee the existence of
at least on pure strategy Nash equilibria.
In the following, we start analyzing the M-interference
game. The comparison between the R-interference game
and the M-interference game is treated in Section 6.




























































Fig. 5. Regions of Fig. 3 that we are considering in Table 1.

















Infinite number of NE
Coincide with optimum
d=1

















Infinite number of NE
Coincide with optimum
d=5


















Infinite number of NE
Coincide with optimum
d=10
Fig. 6. Probability of having different Nash equilibria for the 2-player game, increasing L, for different values of d, assuming g ¼ 103 and a ¼ 4.
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In this section we show how the M-interference game
allows us to reduce the N-player game to small sub-
games. We do this using a directed-inﬂuence-graph-based
approach.
Deﬁnition 5.2 (Directed inﬂuence graph). The directed
inﬂuence graph associated to an N-player game is a
directed graph in which each vertex corresponds to a pair
of nodes, and a directed edge from i to j represents the
fact that transmitter ui is the nearest interferer for
receiver vj.
By deﬁnition of directed inﬂuence graph, it is worth










Fig. 7. When L goes to zero the positions of the two transmitters coincide.
The topology is shown on the left. A zoom of the corresponding region of
Fig. 3 is reported on the right.Remark 5.3. In every directed inﬂuence graph, each vertex
has in-degree equal to 1. In contrast, the out-degree might
be 0;1, or greater than 1.
In Fig. 8, we show the same scenario reported in Fig. 1.
On the left side, each receiver is associated to his closest
interfering transmitter. One the right we report the
associated directed inﬂuence graph. In this case, all pairs
of nodes are coupled, i.e., we obtain couples of players that
mutually interfere each other. Formally, we provide the
following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 5.4 (Coupled users). Users ðui; viÞ and ðuj; vjÞ are
coupled if the nearest interfering transmitter of receiver vj is
ui and the nearest interfering transmitter of receiver vi is uj.
In general, we might not have that all users are coupled.
Therefore we introduce the following deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition 5.5 (Cycle). We say that three or more pairs of
users form a cycle, when the nodes of the associated
directed inﬂuence graph have all in-degree and out-degree
equal to 1.Deﬁnition 5.6 (Chain). We say that one or more pairs of
users form a chain, when the nodes of the associated
directed inﬂuence graph have in-degree and out-degree
equal to 1, except for the leaves of the chain that have
out-degree equal to zero.
Fig. 8. The interference relationships (left) and the associated directed inﬂuence graph (right) for the 6-player game reported in Fig. 1.
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ed as a directed inﬂuence graph that is composed by one or
more isolated sub-graphs. In particular, every isolated sub-
graph has the following property.
Proposition 5.7. Every isolated sub-graph is necessarily
composed by one and only one couple or cycle and might
have one or more chains connected to it.Proof. The proof proceeds by contradiction. Let us assume
that one isolated sub-graphs exists with one of the follow-
ing conﬁgurations: (i) two couples (or cycles), or (ii) one
couple and one cycle; in both cases, couples and cycles have
to be connected by a chain; then, such chain connecting
couples and cycles must have by construction at least one
node with in-degree equal to 2. This contradicts Remark
5.3. Furthermore, it is easy to see that a chain cannot be iso-
lated by itself. This comes again from Remark 5.3, i.e., each
node has in-degree equal to 1. The very same reasoning can
be applied to show that isolated sub-graphs cannot exist
with multiple instances of couples and cycles. h
Fig. 9 reports a random topology composed by N ¼ 20
pairs. In Fig. 10, it is reported the associated directed




















Fig. 9. (Left) Random topology composed by N ¼ 20 pairs, where communicating
is connected to the nearest transmitter with a dotted red line. (Right) Correspon
interference relations are marked with arrows. (For interpretation of the referenc
this article.)of them have a couple and one has a cycle. All of them have
connected chains.
Finally, according to the previous classiﬁcation and
reminding that every node in the graph is a couple of
communicating transmitter and receiver, we will adopt




Users that belong to a cycle
Chain-of-a-couple users
Users that belong to a chain connected to coupled users
Chain-of-a-cycle users
Users that belong to a chain connected to a cycle
5.2. Coupling probability
The reduction through directed inﬂuence graphs allows
us to identify pairs of users that actually play a 2-player
game. Formally, we deﬁne the probability of a typical user
being coupled as:
Deﬁnition 5.8 (Coupling probability). The coupling prob-
ability PcðkÞ is the probability that a typical user, say ðui; viÞ,


















TXs and RXs are connected with a solid black line, whereas each receiver
ding directed inﬂuence graph. Each pairs is substituted with a circle and
es to color in this ﬁgure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of
Fig. 10. Directed inﬂuence graph of the topology reported in Fig. 9. The
graph is composed by three isolated sub-graphs, two of them have a
couple, the other has a cycle. All of them have chains.
pair2pair1
x1=x2=t 
Fig. 11. Reference scenario when k goes to zero. Each black point
represents a pair. Since the distance between pairs is very large, d1 and d2
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Fig. 12. Simulated coupling probability for different values of d ¼ d1 ¼ d2
increasing k.PcðkÞ ¼ Pði ¼ argmin
k–j
kuk  vjkjj ¼ argmin
k–i
kuk  vikÞ:
Refer to Fig. 2. Assume that TX2 is the nearest interferer
for RX1. Note that this means that there is no other
transmitter in the circle (say, C1) of radius x1 with center
RX1, i.e., PN \ C1 ¼ PNðC1Þ ¼ 0. The probability that TX1
is the nearest interferer for RX2 is PcðkÞ ¼ PðPNðC2Þ ¼
0jPNðC1Þ ¼ 0Þ, where C2 is the circle of radius x2 with
center RX2. Although occupancy counts of disjoint regions
are dependent in a BPP, the dependence vanishes in the
limit as the BPP becomes a Poisson Point Process (PPP), i.e.,
as N; jAj !1 with N=jAj ! k. Under this approximation
we have
PcðkÞ 	 PðPkðDÞ ¼ 0Þ ¼ ekjDj;
i.e., the coupling probability is approximately the
void probability for a PPP Pk of intensity k on the lune
D  C2 n C1.
Theorem 5.9. The value for the coupling probability when k
goes to 0 is the following constant:
lim
k!0





þ 8p 	 0:6215:Proof. In the low density (small k) regime the BPP behaves
like the PPP since jAjmust be large. Recall that the average





, and thus for small k the average distance is large.
To obtain the value of the coupling probability in the low
density regime, we can assume that distances x1 and x2
are both much larger than d1 and d2. Thus as k! 0; d1
and d2 can be neglected and we can assume that x1 ¼ x2.
In this scenario, reported in Fig. 11, we have two circles
with the same radius, whose centers are separated by a
distance equal to the radius itself. Therefore, the area of
the lune depends only on the parameter x1. In particular,
using the formula of the area of the lune, we obtain that













Pcjx1 ðk; x1Þf x1ðx1 Þdx1: ð19Þ
The distribution of the nearest interferer is:
f x1ðx1 Þ ¼ 2pkx1epkx
2
1 x1 P 0: ð20Þ
Substituting the expression for f x1 ðx1Þ in Eq. (20) and the














1dx1 ¼ Ccp:  ð21Þ
Fig. 12 show the simulated coupling probability PcðkÞ
for a large range of k, and different values of d, assuming
d ¼ d1 ¼ d2. The black point is Ccp.
Finally, we have numerically evaluated the probability
of being of a speciﬁc type. Fig. 13 shows the probability
distribution over different types of nodes increasing k for
d ¼ 1 and for d ¼ 5. Results show that there exists a regime
(the low density regime) in which nodes are either coupled
or belong to a chain that is connected to a couple. Again, for






























Fig. 13. Probability distribution over different types of node in the
directed inﬂuence graph for d ¼ 1 and d ¼ 5, increasing k.
74 I. Malanchini et al. / Computer Networks 81 (2015) 63–78k that goes to zero, the probability of being coupled
coincide with the exact value derived in Theorem 5.9 for
any value of d.
5.3. Convergence through best response dynamics
The characterization of the M-interference game using
directed inﬂuence graphs leads to scenarios with indepen-
dent sub-graphs. Classiﬁcation, according to Proposition
5.7, and convergence properties are reported in the
following.
 Sub-graph with coupled users. In this kind of
sub-graph, equilibrium can be reached using the
previous analysis of the 2-player game. Namely, the
coupled nodes independently reach the equilibrium
based only on the mutual interfering distances. The
nodes that belong to a chain reach a stable state only
reacting to others’ nodes choices. E.g., the node of a
chain, which is closest to the couple, simply plays the
best response to the choices of the nodes in the couple.
The second node of the chain reacts to the choice of
the ﬁrst, and so on.
 Sub-graph with a cycle. Nodes in a cycle might not
reach an equilibrium point following the best response
dynamics. These critical cases can be managed recalling
that a pure strategy equilibrium always exists, i.e.,
when all nodes play the strategy ð0:5;0:5Þ. Therefore,
nodes that belong to this type of sub-graphs can be
forced to play strategy 0.5. However, in low density
regime the probability of being in a cycle goes to zero.
The analytical characterization of these sub-graphs and
the study of the games played in these substructures is
part of future work. In contrast, in this paper, we have
shown that such decomposition exists. Furthermore, the
convergence properties highlighted above will be
exploited in the following section in order to propose a
distributed protocol that always converges to a stable
solution.6. Game solution algorithms
6.1. Best-response-based algorithm
Having proved the existence of at least one pure strat-
egy Nash equilibrium, we propose in this section a heuris-
tic based on best response dynamics for both the R-
interference game and the M-interference game. It is
worth pointing out that, although existence of Nash equi-
libria is certain in both cases, best response dynamics
may not always converge. To this extent, the proposed
best response heuristic introduces termination condition
in order to guarantee the convergence to a stable point
(which however is not said to be a Nash equilibrium).
The idea is to let each player play the best response but
only for a limited number of times, said T. Such stopping
time T is often effective for a power control algorithm to
limit the number of iterations. When a player changes its
best response T times, then the player is forced to play
0.5. We choose this value because we have proved that
the strategy where each player plays 0.5 is always a pure
strategy Nash equilibrium. The value of T captures the
trade-off between system efﬁciency and system respon-
siveness. Roughly speaking, larger T may lead to better
stable points (eventually equilibria), but on the other side,
this requires larger convergence time. In a practical scenario
of spectrum sharing, the algorithm convergence time rep-
resents a pure overhead, since the wireless nodes cannot
actually use the spectrum during this phase; as an exam-
ple, this may represent the time in which the competing
nodes perform spectrum sensing and spectrum decision.
The Game Heuristic (GH), reported in Algorithm 1,
implements the best response (BR) function for every play-
er; at each cycle veriﬁes which are the players that want to
deviate and picks up randomly one of these players,
applies the best response function adapting the chosen
strategy and consequently evaluates again all the best
responses until no player wants to deviate. Both the
R-interference game and the M-interference game can be
implemented adapting the evaluation of the BR in Step 3
of Algorithm 1.
Algorithm 1. Game heuristic.1: Initialize Pi ¼ randð1Þ and Ti ¼ 0 8 i ¼ 1 . . .N
2: while There exists at least a player k that has
updated its Pk in the last step do
3: Evaluate best response BRi for each player i
4: Search a player k0 such that BRk0 – Pk0 and Tk0 6 T
5: if such a player exists then
6: if Tk0 < T then
7: Pk0  BRk0
8: Tk0  Tk0 þ 1
9: else
10: Pk0  0:5
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Fig. 14. Discretization of the strategy set of each player used in the
simulations.


















Fig. 15. Utility (Shannon rate) obtained at the R-equilibria and M-
equilibria varying k.
I. Malanchini et al. / Computer Networks 81 (2015) 63–78 75We consider a scenario with N ¼ 25 pairs of users, at a
communicatingdistance d ¼ 1.We let k goes from0 to5 (note
that in order to vary k, we vary the area jAj of the convex setA
where the N users are deployed). We assume g ¼ 103 and
a ¼ 4.Weﬁx T ¼ 20, andweaverageover S ¼ 1000 randomly
generated instance. For each instancewederiveK ¼ 20 differ-
ent solutions (i.e.,we run thegamesimulator/protocol starting
from randomly chosen power allocation strategies and this
consequently leads to different termination points). Further-
more, since the strategy set is the continuous set ½0;1, a dis-
cretization is needed. Also, since in the 2-player game, we
have noticed that there are mainly two relevant strategies,
ð0;1Þ  ð1;0Þ and ð0:5;0:5Þ, we deﬁne the strategies adopted
by the users as reported in Fig. 14, where oth refers to all the
strategies but ð0;1Þ  ð1;0Þ and ð0:5;0:5Þ.
We compare the different approaches in terms of uti-
lity, i.e., Shannon capacity. Numerical results show that,
especially in the low density regime, the performance of
the M-equilibria is close to the one that we obtain for the
R-equilibria, in terms of both utility and fairness.1 This is
reported in Fig. 15 and Fig. 16, respectively. As expected,
the performance of the two heuristics are very close. The
R-interference game leads to slightly better performance.
However, it is reasonable to expect that the two heuristics
lead to similar equilibria/stable points.
Theproblemwith theheuristics is the timeof convergence,
aswell as the probability of reaching an equilibriumpoint.We
have pushed T to very large values and we still observe high
probability of non convergence, thus long running time of1 We use the Jain’s fairness index to measure the fairness of the
throughput allocation [31].the algorithm. Fig. 17 reports theprobability for auser of being
forced to 0.5 for different values of k and increasing T.
Therefore, although numerical results support the val-
ue of the M-interference game, we need some better way
to achieve similar allocations in a distributed and fast
way.
6.2. Distributed protocol with minimal information exchange
and fast convergence time
The analysis of best response dynamics proposed in
the previous section suggests that the ‘‘quality’’ of the
points of convergence is comparable in the two games,
which means that the M-game is a reasonably good
approximation for the R-game. Building on this result,
we provide a practical distributed protocol for spectrum
sharing which is fast in convergence and requires
minimal information exchange among wireless nodes.
The pseudocode for the Distributed Sharing Protocol
(DSP) that each couple of communicating nodes runs in
order to decide how to allocate the power is reported in
Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2. Distributed Sharing Protocol.1: Every transmitter i starts transmitting using
Pi ¼ 0:5
2: Every transmitter sends information regarding the
positions of the communicating nodes and the
associated ID
3: Every pair identiﬁes the nearest transmitter ID,
and broadcast this information
4: Every node is able to evaluate if it is coupled or not
5: for every i and j that are coupled do
6: i and j play the 2-player game equilibrium, for
which no coordination is required
7: end for
8: for every node is not coupled do
9: monitor of the perceived interference in the two
bands
10: adapt the power allocation according to the
perceived interference, i.e., play the best response
11: end for
Note that DSP requires information on the position of
the neighboring nodes so that each node is able to deter-
mine either it is coupled or not. Coupled users play the best
response deterministically without any best response
interactions. ID information can be useful for coordination
when more than one equilibrium exists (e.g., whenever the
2-player game admits as equilibrium either ð0;1Þ and
ð1;0Þ, the node with smaller ID plays ﬁrst choosing either
0 or 1, and the other node accordingly replies). Users that
belong to a chain connected to the couple play a one-shot
best response and the convergence time will depend on
how long is the chain. Also in this case there is not iterative
response among users. Finally, since we have shown in
Section 5.3 that cycles are difﬁcult to treat, we force users
that belong to cycles to 0.5. By construction, DSP always
converge to an equilibrium of the M-interference game





















Fig. 18. Utility (Shannon rate) obtained with the different approaches
varying k.




















Fig. 19. Fairness obtained with the different approaches varying k.




























Fig. 20. Probability of reaching a Nash equilibrium at the termination.



















Fig. 16. Fairness obtained at the R-equilibria and M-equilibria varying k.




































Fig. 17. Probability of being forced to termination, i.e., of not conver-
gence, for both the R-equilibria and the M-equilibria and different values
of k.
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76 I. Malanchini et al. / Computer Networks 81 (2015) 63–78(each player i changes the starting strategy Pi ¼ 0:5 at most
once) and it is distributed in the sense that it relies upon
information that can easily be available at each node.
Table 2 reports a summary of the properties of the game
heuristic (reported in Algorithm 1) and the DSP (reported
in Algorithm 2) and shows the beneﬁts of DSP in terms
of convergence and stability of the reached point.The quality of the equilibria reached by the DSP is dis-
cussed hereafter through simulations. We evaluate the
performance of the proposed protocol, considering the
same scenario introduced before. We compare the differ-
ent approaches in terms of utility, i.e., Shannon capacity,
and fairness. Results are reported in Figs. 18 and 19. In


























































Fig. 22. Average throughput per user in WiFi scenario for different values
of k.
I. Malanchini et al. / Computer Networks 81 (2015) 63–78 77the same ﬁgures, we report the performance of: ‘‘0.5-equi-
librium’’, in which each player plays the strategy 0.5. Also,
we compare the results with a ‘‘water ﬁlling’’-based
approach (Wf). In this case, users start transmitting
sequentially in a random order and adapt the power over
the two bands treating as noise the users that already
started their transmissions, without any further adaptation
or coordination among users. Numerical results show that
both the DSP and the GH improve the quality of the ‘‘0.5-
equilibrium’’, which is the reason why we introduce such
mechanisms instead of letting all players simply play the
strategy 0.5.
Advantages of the proposed DSP are shown in Fig. 20
and Fig. 21, which show, respectively, the probability that
the state reached at the termination is a stable point (by
Nash equilibrium deﬁnition, according to the speciﬁc BR)
and the number of iterations to converge. The R-interfer-
ence game converges to a solution that satisﬁes the NE
condition with probability that in general could be very
far from one. In contrast, the M-interference game has a
probability very close to one. Similarly, the DSP reaches astable point with probability equal to one. In terms of con-
verge time, the DSP dramatically reduces the number of
iterations with respect to both the R-interference game
and the M-interference game. Note that the water ﬁlling
policy converges fast but it never satisﬁes the equilibrium
condition, having no coordination among the users.
Finally, we show the performance of the DSP as well
as the other approaches in terms of network throughput.
In particular, we consider the very same network
topologies used so far for the analysis and deﬁned in
Section 6.1, we let each transmitter–receiver couple
communicate according to the power policy derived by
the different algorithms and we evaluate in such settings
the per-user throughput assuming that the IEEE 802.11g
technology is adopted at the physical and MAC layers.
Fig. 22 reports the average per-user throughput under
different topologies (different values of the network spa-
tial density parameter k). The game heuristic and the
DSP increase the network performance up to 25% with
respect to both the water ﬁlling and the case in which
the power is equally spitted over the two channels
(‘‘0.5-eq’’). Moreover, the main beneﬁt of the proposed
DSP with respect to the game heuristics is in terms of
convergence time. In average, the DSP solution is reached
with less than 5 iterations, whereas the game heuristics
may require some hundreds.7. Conclusion
In this work, we analyze the spectrum sharing problem
in ad hoc wireless networks where multiple pairs share the
same portion of the spectrum. In this scenario, the ‘‘qual-
ity’’ perceived by each receiver is inﬂuenced by the behav-
ior of the other transmitters, then we model the problem
as a non-cooperative game.
First, we consider the scenario composed by 2 pairs of
transmitter and receiver. We model this case as a 2-player
game and we provide explicit characterization of the pure
strategy Nash equilibria. Furthermore, due to the tight
dependence of the equilibria with the position of the users
and distances between interfering nodes, we analyze the
problem using stochastic geometry, assuming that pairs
are randomly dropped.
The 2-player game analysis becomes then fundamental
for making the N-player game tractable. We consider both
the R-interference game and the M-interference game.
Numerical evaluation shows that they are very close in
terms of both strategy selection and user’s utility, especial-
ly for the low k regime. Therefore, we concentrate on the
M-interference game, which can be analyzed using a
directed-inﬂuence graph approach. In particular, we char-
acterize the probability of being ‘‘coupled’’ and derive its
value for k that goes to zero.
Finally, using the results of the theoretic models, we
propose a distributed protocol for spectrum sharing in ad
hoc networks. This allows to reach performance very close
to the game, but with a signiﬁcantly less number of itera-
tions and probability of converging to an equilibrium point
equal to one.
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